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Note to the Translator:
The term “nuclear forensics” does not seem to have a direct Russian equivalent.  It is 
sometimes translated as “nuclear criminalistics” or “identification of nuclear material.”  
Neither of these terms gives the precise meaning of the English term.  Consequently, the 
definitions of the terms “nuclear forensics” and “nuclear attribution” provided in the 
second section of the paper should be tied to whatever Russian words are used in the rest 
of the paper to translate these terms
Introduction
Nuclear forensics has become increasingly important in the fight against illicit trafficking 
in nuclear and other radioactive materials [1].  The illicit trafficking of nuclear materials 
is, of course, an international problem; nuclear materials may be mined and milled in one 
country, manufactured in a second country, diverted at a third location, and detected at a 
fourth. There have been a number of articles in public policy journals in the past year that 
call for greater interaction between the U. S. and the rest of the world on the topic of 
nuclear forensics [2-6].  Some believe that such international cooperation would help 
provide a more certain capability to identify the source of the nuclear material used in a 
terrorist event.  An improved international nuclear forensics capability would also be 
important as part of the IAEA verification toolkit, particularly linked to increased access 
provided by the additional protocol.  
A recent study has found that, although international progress has been made in securing 
weapons-usable HEU and Pu, the effort is still insufficient [7].  They found that nuclear 
material, located in 40 countries, could be obtained by terrorists and criminals and used 
for a crude nuclear weapon.  Through 2006, the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database [8-9] 
had recorded a total of 607 confirmed events involving illegal possession, theft, or loss of
nuclear and other radioactive materials. Although it is difficult to predict the future 
course of such illicit trafficking, increasingly such activities are viewed as significant 
threats that merit the development of special capabilities.  As early as April, 1996, 
nuclear forensics was recognized at the G-8 Summit in Moscow as an important element 
of an illicit nuclear trafficking program.  Given international events over the past several 
years, the value and need for nuclear forensics seems greater than ever.
Determining how and where legitimate control of nuclear material was lost and tracing 
the route of the material from diversion through interdiction are important goals for 
nuclear forensics and attribution.  It is equally important to determine whether additional 
devices or materials that pose a threat to public safety are also available.  Finding the 
answer to these questions depends on determining the source of the material and its 
method of production.  Nuclear forensics analysis and interpretation provide essential 
insights into methods of production and sources of illicit radioactive materials.  However, 
they are most powerful when combined with other sources of information, including 
intelligence and traditional detective work.  The certainty of detection and punishment for 
those who remove nuclear materials from legitimate control provides the ultimate 
deterrent for such diversion and, ultimately, for the intended goal of such diversion, 
including nuclear terrorism or proliferation.  Consequently, nuclear forensics is an 
integral part of "nuclear deterrence" in the 21st century. 
Nuclear forensics will always be limited by the diagnostic information inherent in the 
interdicted material.  Important markers for traditional forensics (fingerprints, stray 
material, etc.) can be eliminated or obscured, but many nuclear materials have inherent 
isotopic or chemical characteristics that serve as unequivocal markers of specific sources, 
production processes, or transit routes.  The information needed for nuclear forensics 
goes beyond that collected for most commercial and international verification activities.  
Fortunately, the international nuclear engineering enterprise has a restricted number of 
conspicuous process steps that makes the interpretation process easier.  Ultimately, 
though, it will always be difficult to distinguish between materials that reflect similar 
source or production histories, but are derived from disparate sites.
Due to the significant capital costs of the equipment and the specialized expertise of the 
personnel, work in the field of nuclear forensics has been restricted so far to a handful of 
national and international laboratories.  There are a limited number of specialists who 
have experience working with interdicted nuclear materials and affiliated evidence.  
Therefore, a knowledge management system that utilizes information resources relevant 
to nuclear forensic and attribution signatures, processes, origins, and pathways, allowing 
subject matter experts to access the right information in order to interpret forensics data 
and draw appropriate conclusions, is essential. In order to determine the origin, point of 
diversion of the nuclear material, and those responsible for the unauthorized transfer, 
close relationships are required between governments who maintain inventories and data 
of fissile or other radioactive materials.  Numerous databases exist in many countries and 
organizations that could be valuable for the future development and application of 
nuclear forensics.  The contents of many of these databases may never be shared directly, 
but even the development of a worldwide, “distributed” database would greatly benefit 
international efforts.  Only by sharing information about nuclear processes and materials 
can participants benefit from collective experience and knowledge to evaluate and 
prosecute nuclear trafficking cases.  By encouraging the participation of those states 
where nuclear materials originate, the international community of nuclear forensics 
scientists gain important insights into the material required to deter future acts of nuclear 
smuggling.
Definitions
Historically, the terms “nuclear forensics” and “nuclear attribution” have been used 
interchangeably.  Over the past few years, however, nuclear forensics experts have 
emphasized a distinction between the two terms.
Nuclear attribution is a process to identify the source of nuclear or other radioactive 
materials used in illegal activities, determine the point-of-origin and routes of transit 
involving such material, and ultimately contribute to the prosecution of those responsible. 
Nuclear attribution utilizes many inputs including: 1) results from nuclear forensic 
sample analyses; 2) understandings of radiochemical signatures and environmental 
signatures; 3) knowledge of the methods for production of nuclear materials and nuclear 
weapons development pathway; and 4) information from law enforcement and 
intelligence sources.  Nuclear attribution is the integration of all relevant forms of 
information about a nuclear smuggling incident into data that can be readily analyzed and 
interpreted to form the basis of a confident response to the incident.  The goal of the 
attribution process is to answer policy makers’ needs, requirements, and questions in their 
framework for a given incident. 
Nuclear forensics is the analysis of intercepted illicit nuclear or radioactive materials and 
any associated materials to provide evidence for nuclear attribution.  The goal of nuclear 
forensics analysis is to identify forensic indicators in interdicted nuclear and other 
radioactive samples or its surrounding environment, e.g., the container or transport 
vehicle.  These indicators arise from known relationships between material characteristics 
and process history.  Thus, nuclear forensics analysis includes the characterization of the 
material and correlation with production history. 
Key U.S. and Russian, and international players 
United States
There are several U. S. governmental departments and organizations with an interest in 
nuclear forensics.  The National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (NTNFC) has the 
central coordinating role for nuclear forensics in the U. S. government.  In addition, they 
provide direct financial support to the material nuclear forensics research & development 
program.  The NTNFC is a part of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) in the 
Department of Homeland Security. The U. S. Department of State is the lead department 
for all interactions with foreign governments.  There are a number of groups within the 
State Department with an interest in nuclear forensics, including the Nuclear Trafficking 
Response Group, the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative, the Preventing Nuclear 
Smuggling Program, the Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction, and the Global 
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.  The Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
(DTRA), a part of the Department of Defense, primarily funds activities in post-
detonation nuclear forensics, that is, activities aimed at providing information for 
attribution of a detonated nuclear device (nuclear yield) or radiological dispersal device 
(RDD).
The National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) within the Department of Energy has 
several organizations interested in nuclear forensics:
· A new organization (NA-45) has been created with the responsibility for 
interdicted, but unexploded, nuclear devices.  This mission includes not only 
ensuring that the device is rendered safe, but also for enabling the analysis of the 
device and its constituent materials necessary to determine its origin.  
· In the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program, different offices have funded 
research & development in some areas of nuclear forensics as part of their 
mission area in Dismantlement and Transparency (NA-241); international
initiatives as part of their mission in Global Security Engagement & Cooperation 
(NA-242; and research & development activities with direct application to nuclear 
forensics (NA-22).
As experts in the technology of nuclear weapons and the civilian and military fuel cycles, 
the DOE national laboratories provide technical support for these U. S. government 
programs.  Laboratories conducting research & development in the area of nuclear 
forensics include Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Los Alamos 
National Laboratory (LANL), Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Argonne 
National Laboratory (ANL), Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory (ORNL), Sandia National Laboratory (SNL), and Idaho National 
Laboratory (INL).
Russia
In the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for interactions 
with foreign governments and is the counterpart to the U. S. Department of State.  
Delegations from the U. S. Department of State and the Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs form the bilateral Counter Terrorism Working Group (CTWG).
RosAtom is the Federal Atomic Energy Agency and is responsible for the Russian 
nuclear enterprise.  RosAtom provides policy guidance and control to the many Russian 
institutes and nuclear manufacturing sites.
The Bochvar Institute (VNIINM) has been designated as the leading institute for nuclear 
forensics in Russia.  However, all of the Russian institutes and combines have expertise 
relevant to the nuclear forensics mission, including VNIITF, the Russian Institute of 
Experimental Physics (VNIIEF), the Angarsk Electrolytic Chemical Combine, the Mayak 
Production Association, Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrate, Elektrostal, etc.
European Union
The Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU) is the nuclear forensics laboratory for the 
European Commission.  Nevertheless, many of the countries of the European Community 
have their own national nuclear forensics laboratories.  For example, the French nuclear 
forensic laboratory is the Commisariat à l’Énergie Atomique (CEA).  The British nuclear 
forensics laboratory is part of the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE).
International technical working group (ITWG)
Many international nuclear forensics laboratories are cooperating to develop common 
technical strategies and knowledge bases that catalog nuclear processes for use in 
interpretation.  The Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group (ITWG) 
was formed in 1996 to foster international cooperation in combating illicit trafficking of 
nuclear materials [10].  More than 30 nations and organizations have participated in 11 
international meetings and 2 round-robin analytical trials to-date.  Technical priorities for 
the ITWG include the development of accepted protocols for the collection of evidence 
and laboratory investigations, the prioritization of techniques and methods for forensic 
analyses for nuclear and non nuclear samples, the organization of inter-laboratory 
forensic exercises, the development of forensic databases to assist in interpretation, and 
technical assistance for requesting countries. 
The nuclear forensics laboratories participating in the ITWG are committed to 
undertaking the characterization of nuclear or other radioactive materials that have been 
confiscated and submitted to analysis by legal prosecution authorities.  These laboratories 
have pledged to cooperate closely among themselves and with prosecuting authorities in 
order to facilitate the elucidation of illicit events involving nuclear and other radioactive 
materials.  U. S. participation in the ITWG is sponsored by the U. S. State Department.  
Scientists from LLNL and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) have 
represented the United States from a scientific and technological perspective, while 
federal employees from the U. S. Department of State, Department of Homeland 
Security, and Department of Energy have represented U. S. policy interests over the 
years.  Historically, the Russian Federation has been represented by attendees from 
RosAtom, although there was broader Russian participation at the ITWG Meeting in 
Obninsk in 1996.  At ITWG-10 in Umea, Sweden, in 2007, two scientists from the 
Bochvar Institute accompanied the RosAtom representative and immediately became 
active participants in the meeting.  
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an active participant in this group 
and serves as an intermediary between individual countries and the ITWG as necessary.  
The IAEA also keeps track of the nuclear smuggling problem through the International 
Trafficking Database (ITDB).
Areas of potential collaboration
Improved methods of analysis 
Scientific analyses are the source of all nuclear forensic data.  In general, improving 
methods of analysis is considered a purely scientific endeavor – with few, if any, security 
restrictions.  Therefore, improving our methods of analysis might be an easy place to 
begin collaboration.   However, precision and accuracy, incremental improvements in 
existing analytical techniques (Annex 2) are not likely to produce significant 
improvements in the nuclear forensic conclusions.  Techniques that measure new 
properties of the material, which are independent from currently measured properties and 
strongly influenced by manufacturing process or location, would be particularly valuable.
Techniques that are significantly more sensitive or have significantly greater spatial 
resolution may also be valuable.  Some analytical techniques currently require more 
sample material than is typically available; research and development to reduce the 
amount of material required would be important.  So also, techniques that reduce the limit 
of detection or improve spatial resolution may reveal signatures that are hidden from us 
now.  Previous efforts have moved signature discovery from the realm of bulk signatures 
(mm spatial scale) to micro-signatures (µm spatial scale); now, we need to move into the 
realm of nano-signatures (nm spatial scale).
Signature discovery
More important to the nuclear forensics enterprise than improved analytical techniques, 
though, is the discovery of new signatures – properties of the material that reveal the 
creator, how it was made, why it was made, and so on.  Signatures provide meaning to 
the analytical data.  However, for the same reason that signature discovery is more 
critical to nuclear forensics, it is also subject more concerns – proprietary concerns, 
security concerns, etc.  We still may be able to make progress, despite these concerns, in 
two ways.  First, we can start by working together to identify signatures for lower-threat 
nuclear materials, e.g., uranium ores, uranium ore concentrates (yellowcake), UF6, or 
reactor fuel pellets.  The material characteristics of these materials will not be as sensitive 
as higher-threat materials, such as HEU or Pu.  As we build trust in our cooperative 
enterprise, we may be able to move towards these higher threat materials.  Second, we 
can start developing generalized signatures, which cause less security concerns, and work 
towards more specific ones.  For example, we may feel very comfortable in saying that 
“we find that the concentrations of Nb, Re, and W in reactor fuel pellets are very 
indicative of the fuel manufacturer,” but not comfortable in saying that “this specific 
manufacturer always has between 30 and 40 ppmw of Nb in their material.
Knowledge management & analysis techniques 
Knowledge management is one area that seems both important for the future of nuclear 
forensics and one that can be approached independently from concerns about data 
security. The fully populated nuclear forensics database is expected to be vast, 
particularly considering the broad range of nuclear materials to be covered and the 
extensive list of materials properties that may be important.  We hope that the signatures 
discovery process will be able to reduce the number of properties required for adequate 
identification, but, until that proves to be the case, nuclear forensic data is likely to 
include as many properties as can be measured, given time and funding.  In addition to 
raw nuclear forensics data, we also need the ability to store information about production 
processes and locations throughout the history of nuclear materials production.
Areas of productive collaboration might include methods for storing and managing all of 
this information, methods for analyzing these large amounts of multidimensional data in 
order to extract signatures using new, or at least newly applied, mathematical and 
statistical techniques.  For example, at LLNL, we are exploring the use of principal 
components analysis (PCA) and partial least squares discriminant analysis (PLSDA) for 
reducing the dimensionality of the data to allow the user to visualize patterns and 
groupings in the data.
Confidence articulation
Ultimately, national decision makers will want clearly stated answers with an appropriate 
estimate of the reliability of that answer.  Conclusions will, no doubt, be reached by the 
application of multiple signatures, each with its own estimate of reliability, to multiple 
material analyses, each with its own measured precision and accuracy.  All of these 
uncertainties must be reduced to an overall level of confidence.  This end goal will 
require the development and application of very sophisticated statistical methods.  These 
research and development projects could, again, be conducted independently of tightly 
held data and signatures.
Future nuclear fuel cycles
The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), recently announced by DOE Secretary 
Bodman [11], poses significant new challenges with regard to securing, safeguarding, 
monitoring and tracking nuclear materials.  In order to reduce the risk of nuclear 
proliferation, new technologies must be developed to reduce the risk that nuclear material 
can be diverted from its intended use.  Regardless of the specific nature of the fuel cycle, 
nuclear forensics and attribution will play key roles to ensure the effectiveness of non-
proliferation controls and to deter the likelihood of illicit activities.  Ensuring that 
individuals or organizations participating in illicit trafficking are rapidly identified and 
apprehended following theft or diversion of nuclear material will continue to provide the 
best deterrent against unlawful activities.  Key to establishing this deterrent is developing 
the ability to rapidly and accurately determine the identity, source and prior use history of 
any interdicted nuclear material.
Taggants offer one potentially effective means for positively identifying lost or stolen 
nuclear fuels.  Taggants are materials that can be encoded with a unique signature and 
introduced into nuclear fuel during fuel fabrication.  During a nuclear forensics 
investigation, the taggant signature can be recovered and the nuclear material identified 
through comparison with information stored in an appropriate database. Unlike serial 
numbers or barcodes, taggants can provide positive identification with only partial 
recovery, providing extreme resistance to any attempt to delete or alter them.
We have investigated the characteristics of a number of elements for use as potential 
taggants by modeling their behavior under irradiation using a standard reactor depletion 
code.  We concentrated our efforts on elements that lie on either side of the fission yield 
curve (masses below ~70 or above ~170) to avoid overwhelming the taggant signature 
with the resulting build-up of fission products.  In evaluating the results of these 
simulations, we looked for elements with multiple isotopes of low neutron absorption 
cross-sections.  The ratios of these elements will not change very much during irradiation 
and can be used to encode information about the fuel.  It would also be desirable to have 
a few isotopes that do change markedly under irradiation, since the relative abundance of 
these isotopes in irradiated fuel could serve as a measure of the neutron energy spectrum 
of the reactor and the fluence experience by the fuel.
Many questions regarding the behavior of the taggant during reprocessing and the effect 
of low levels (tens of ppmw) of the taggant on fuel fabrication and performance have yet 
to be addressed.  These studies would be excellent areas for joint research and 
development activities. 
International Leadership
In 2005 and 2006, Presidents Bush and Putin announced the Bratislava Initiatives and the 
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism [12-13], respectively.  In the name of 
nuclear security cooperation and building capacity to combat terrorism, these initiatives 
call for enhancing ability to detect and suppress illicit trafficking and other illicit 
activities involving nuclear and radiological materials.  Bi-lateral cooperation in this area 
would improve technical capabilities, by bringing together our countries excellent 
expertise in the area of nuclear forensics.  Such cooperation would also set a significant 
precedent that might encourage greater international cooperation and sharing in this 
important nonproliferation and counterterrorism arena, particularly as the future 
international nuclear fuel cycle framework evolves.
Challenges to address
Security
The primary obstacle to greater nuclear forensics collaboration between the United States 
and the Russian Federation are security concerns regarding sharing of data and 
knowledge. To further complicate this challenge, the security restrictions placed on 
information sharing are not symmetrical.  For example, the United States considers the 
isotopic composition of its HEU to be unclassified, while the Russian Federation 
considers it a state secret.  On the other hand, the United States considers the mass of 
certain components of its nuclear weapons to be classified, while the Russian Federation 
does not.  
Under some circumstances, the U.S. and the Russian Federation have shared classified or 
sensitive information with each other.  For example, as part of the HEU Transparency 
Program, for example, some of the isotopic data that the Russians consider classified was 
shared with the U.S.  Further consideration of ability to share information should balance 
the risk of disclosure with the benefit of disclosure.  Balancing the potential benefits, for 
both Russia and the U.S., of a greatly improved nuclear forensics system, enabling rapid 
identification of nuclear material to improve counter-terrorism and non-proliferation 
capabilities, with national security concerns, should be explored more fully in the near 
future.
Funding
The U.S. has greatly increased the level of funding for nuclear forensics research and 
development since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  Prior to this event, 
nuclear forensics was funded in a small way by far-sighted managers in the Department 
of Energy and by internal investments by a few national laboratories.  However, despite 
this significant increase, the overall level of funding is small compared to the vastness of 
the technical issues that need addressing. It appears that nuclear forensics research & 
development performed in the Russian Federation, has been largely funded by the U.S.  
Looking to the future, this area of cooperation seems to be ideally suited for new U.S.-
Russian partnerships bilaterally and with third countries, should adequate national 
funding be obtained.
Legal & policy framework for cooperation
Much of our collaborative work in nuclear forensics has been conducted so far with 
reference to technical cooperation under the Nuclear Materials Protection, Control, and 
Accounting (MPC&A) Program. Although MPC&A is quite different from nuclear 
forensics, often the master task agreements negotiated under the MPC&A program are 
broad enough to accommodate nuclear forensic activities. Another umbrella agreement 
that has been used is the Warhead Safety and Security Exchange Agreements (WSSX).  
This agreement, in negotiation for renewal, provides for the exchange of unclassified 
technical information to enhance nuclear safety and security in both Russia and the 
United States. 
The International Science and Technology Center (ISTC), established in 1992, is a 
program that the U.S. has used to fund cooperative research projects with Russian 
institutes.  The ISTC coordinates the efforts of numerous governments, international 
organizations, and private sector industries, providing weapons scientists from Russia and 
the Commonwealth of Independent States new opportunities in international partnership. 
Through its political, legal, and financial frameworks, the ISTC contributes to 
Fundamental Research, International Programs and Innovation and Commercialization, 
by linking the demands of international markets with the exceptional pool of scientific 
talent available in Russian and CIS institutes.
There are several bilateral and international agreements that support the ultimate goal of 
nuclear forensics, i.e., the deterrence of nuclear smuggling and ultimately nuclear 
proliferation and terrorism.  UN Security Council Resolution 1540 obligates states to take 
steps to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and supporting technologies.  
The  Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, originally signed by Presidents Bush 
and Putin in 2006, is broad enough coverage to support many collaborative activities in 
nuclear forensics and related activities.  In the context of these agreements, new bilateral 
agreements between the U.S. and Russian may be needed to support the data exchange 
necessary for a completely successful collaboration in nuclear forensics.  
Conclusions
There are many challenges that the U.S. and Russia can work to overcome in the coming 
years.  Bilateral and multilateral cooperation is needed to advance an international 
forensics capability, needed to combat terrorism and stop nuclear weapons proliferation.  
Whether we pursue the establishment of an international sample archive or an actual 
sample library, with an internationally managed data and knowledge base, solutions will 
require a long time and many difficult negotiations to gain approval from all of the 
relevant countries.  The U.S. and Russia can work together to initiate an approach that 
will advance international cooperation.
No collaboration in the area of nuclear forensics can be more important than that between 
the U.S.  and Russia.  We are the two largest nuclear weapons states - in size and 
capability.  We have the largest stockpiles of weapons and material, the greatest number 
of experts in all facets of the nuclear enterprise, and both face the unacceptable risk of 
weapons-usable material falling into the wrong hands.  With proper funding from both 
governments and with the appropriate bilateral agreements that allow appropriate data 
exchange while still protecting each country’s national security interests, we can make 
great progress together in improving our mutual nuclear forensics capabilities and 
strengthening the deterrence effect that it engenders and set an example for greater 
international cooperation.
Annex 1: LLNL collaborations with Russian and FSU Institutes
Analysis of interdicted HEU sample (LLNL/VNIINM)
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and the A.A. Bochvar All-Russian 
Scientific Research Institute for Inorganic Materials (VNIINM) collaborated on the 
analysis of a highly enriched uranium (HEU) sample from 2004-2006.  Bulgarian 
customs officers interdicted the sample on May 29, 1999. The sample was transferred to 
LLNL for analysis on February 24, 2000.  Extensive analysis of the sample was
performed by LLNL, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Argonne National 
Laboratory (ANL), and Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). These analyses 
confirmed that the material was HEU (~73% 235U) from irradiated reactor fuel 
reprocessed around 1993.  Nuclear and forensic signatures suggested an origin in Russia 
or the former Soviet Union. However, the U.S. lack of knowledge regarding exact 
Russian reactor characteristics prevented matching of U and Pu isotopics by reactor 
modeling.  We were also unfamiliar with the process necessary to produce UO2 with such 
particle sizes in the range of 0.1-1 μm.
The U.S.-Russian Counter Terrorism Working Group sought to establish a model for 
real-time interaction between U. S. national laboratories and Russian institutes on a real 
nuclear forensics case.  They established an action item during their meeting on July 22-
23, 2003, for the US to provide a portion of the “Bulgarian” HEU sample to a Russian 
institute for nuclear forensic analysis, including confirming laboratory analyses, reactor 
modeling, and material identification. This was considered to be a first step towards a 
new mechanism for sharing information and analysis relating to illicitly trafficked 
nuclear material.  As part of this first step, the United States would provide funding for 
the Russian analysis of the sample and interpretation of the results.
U. S. Ambassador Black, in a letter to Foreign Minister Safonov, identified LLNL as the 
U. S. technical lead on the project.  The Russian Foreign Ministry, in consultation with 
RosAtom, identified the Bochvar Institute as the Russian nuclear forensics laboratory for 
the project.  Accordingly, LLNL negotiated a contract with the Bochvar Institute for the 
analysis and interpretation of a 0.59 gram aliquot of the original sample.  Because of the 
small sample size, the Bochvar Institute was not able to perform a full radiochemical 
analysis, similar to that performed by LLNL.  The contract between LLNL and VNIINM 
was signed on July 8, 2004, by both parties.
The analyses by the Bochvar Institute confirmed the findings of the U. S. national 
laboratories in all respects.  In addition, the Russians found a minor, Al-containing phase 
in the sample that was not found in the US analyses.  This phase could possibly be 
important in the attribution process.  The Russians agreed with the general interpretations 
of the U. S. researchers:  that the material was reprocessed HEU, that it was irradiated in 
a reactor to extremely high burn-up, and that it was probably being prepared for research 
actor fuel.  However, they felt that this sample could have been produced by any nuclear 
state possessing the appropriate processing facilities and could not be attributed uniquely 
to Russia or the FSU.
Identifying characteristics of research reactor fuel (LLNL/VNIITF)
LLNL collaborated with the Federal State Unitary Enterprise-Russian Federal Nuclear 
Center – Academician Zababakhin Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics 
(VNIITF), located in Snezhinsk, in the area of identifying characteristics of research 
reactor fuel. Research reactor fuel is one of the most significant nuclear threats because 
the material is frequently HEU and weapons-usable, and many research reactors are pulse 
reactors that experience very low burn-up.  Consequently, the radioactivity in the fuel 
elements decays very quickly after use so the HEU parts can often be picked up by hand 
after only a few days without any adverse consequences.  In addition, research reactors 
are frequently not protected at a level commensurate with the risk of diversion of a 
significant quantity of HEU .
VNIITF conducted detailed materials analyses of 3 research reactor fuels.  They 
completed the analyses of 3 research reactor fuels.  However, VNIITF had difficulty in 
obtaining export approval for the resulting data and eventually provided a report 
compiled from fuel design specifications and “binned” experimental data. 
A current contract with VNIITF is exploring that possibility.  This contract is funded by 
the U. S. National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (NTNFC), an organization in the 
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) of the Department of Homeland Security.  
This FY07 contract consists of 3 tasks:
1. Development of data structures and format for a bilateral US/RF database for 
research reactor fuel.  The key goal of this task is the test-loading of the database 
with data from 1 US and 1 RF research reactor.
2. Development of animations of 1 US and 1 Russian research reactor.  It is felt that 
these animations are necessary to understand the mechanical structure of the 
research reactor fuel.  Research reactor designs are highly individualized and 
typically consist of many fissile and non-fissile parts.
3. Development of methods for reconstructing the original geometry of research 
reactor parts from fragments of the original fuel.
We believe that the success of this project will lead to a larger effort that must necessarily 
involve the participation of multiple Russian institutes and US national laboratories.  It 
will also require high-level approval from the U. S. and Russian governments in order to 
populate the database with information about some of the more sensitive reactor designs.
LLNL collaboration the Former Soviet Union (FSU)
Over the past fifty years, Central Asia has supplied the majority of uranium to the 
military and civilian nuclear fuel cycle of the Soviet Union and subsequently to the 
emerging republics of the former Soviet Union.  Therefore, uranium ores, ore 
concentrates, and reactor fuels collected from Central Asia are critical elements for any 
sample reference library for nuclear forensics. 
Over the past three years, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has funded LLNL 
to collaborate with specialists with the Kazakhstan National Atomic Agency 
“Kazatomprom” to understand the characteristics of their uranium ore concentrate.  In 
addition, the same project funds a project at the ULBA Metallurgical Plant, a subsidiary 
of Kazatomprom and one of the largest nuclear fuel manufacturers in the world, to 
conduct research on the identifying characteristics of low-enriched uranium oxide fuel 
pellets.
The Global Security Engagement and Cooperation (GSEC) Office of the U. S. National 
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is supporting efforts to combat international 
nuclear smuggling through widening the knowledge base of uranium ore, uranium ore 
concentrates, and uranium tailings in Central Asia. In FY06, GSEC and LLNL teamed 
with technical experts from Vostokredmet in Tajikistan to sample and characterize 
uranium ore and uranium tailings from the country’s Taboshar and Karta 1-9 uranium 
mining and milling sites.  In FY07, GSEC and LLNL expanded this work to Kyrgyzstan, 
where we partner with the Ministry of Emergencies to sample and analyze uranium ores 
and uranium ore concentrates from the Kara Balta and Ming Kush sites. All of these 
samples have been, or will be, analyzed for major, minor, and trace elements, as well as 
the isotopic composition of the uranium.
Our initial results indicate the ability of the forensics signatures to differentiate unique 
sources of Central Asian uranium.  For example, in Tajikistan, concentrations of the 
alkali elements (Na), alkaline earth elements (Ca), trace elements, such as Zn, Pb, V, and 
Ni, light rare earth elements (Ce, La, Nd) and U-234 isotopic content vary uniquely and 
distinguish individual sources of uranium. Based on these results, sampling is being 
expanded to include other sites in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.  Together, this 
collaboration and these results are the foundation of a comprehensive nuclear forensics 
program in Central Asia.
Since 2002, LLNL has also partnered with the Uzbekhistan Institute of Nuclear Physics 
in Tashkent, with funding provided by the Institute for Science & Technology of the 
Ukraine (ISTCU), in a number of projects aimed at improving Uzbekhistan’s capabilities 
to detect and analyze illicit nuclear material. For example, one project funded the 
deployment of a network for radiation monitors at the over 400 border checkpoints in 
Uzbekhistan for the detection of the movement of radioactive materials across their
borders.  Another project funded the development of a mobile laboratory to provide 
interdiction support to these checkpoints, as well as rapid response in the event of 
accidents releasing contamination. Still another project funded the development of 
modern nuclear forensic methods for detecting, determining, and origination of materials 
seized in illegal trafficking cases. 
Annex 2: The nuclear forensic process [14]
Incident response
IAEA-TECDOC-1313 “Response to events involving the inadvertent movement or illicit 
trafficking of radioactive materials” provides detailed recommendations for the initial 
response to the interdiction of illicit nuclear material [15].  There are 3 key goals to any 
response:
· Minimization of any radiation hazards associated with the incident site
· Control of the nuclear or other radioactive material
· Preservation of both nuclear and associated traditional forensic evidence
From the standpoint of nuclear forensics, preservation of the evidence is vital.  All 
activities should be sequenced to minimize destruction or contamination of the evidence.  
Furthermore, the collection of traditional forensics evidence should be performed in a 
manner that preserves the integrity of the nuclear forensics evidence and vice versa.  It is 
essential that appropriate thought be given to the relative timing of the collection of 
radioactive evidence relative to traditional forensic evidence.   However, the collection of 
forensic evidence must always be consistent with good radiological safety practice. 
Because of these detailed considerations, the incident investigators should be trained as, 
or accompanied by, a forensic scientist.
Due consideration must also be given to the legal ramifications of evidence collection.
For example, the incident investigators must maintain appropriate chain-of-custody 
procedures during the evidence collection process. The nuclear forensic laboratory must 
then maintain the chain-of-custody paperwork that will tie the analytical results and 
conclusions to specific samples and crime scene locations. 
Sampling & distribution
Evidence should be sent for analysis at a nuclear forensics laboratory, which is equipped 
to receive and process such samples.  It is highly likely that the evidence is commingled, 
that is, that the traditional forensic evidence is contaminated with radioactive material 
and that the radioactive material contains some forensic evidence.  Therefore, the 
receiving laboratory should be able to handle radioactive material and carefully separate 
the traditional forensic evidence from the radioactive material for later analysis by 
experts in each discipline. Nuclear forensics laboratories are outfitted and staffed to 
handle contaminated evidence and accommodate the requirements of both the traditional 
forensics and nuclear analysis.
The nuclear analysis laboratory should be an appropriately accredited and recognized 
facility with analytical procedures and staff qualifications that are documented and can 
withstand both scientific peer-review and legal scrutiny. The receiving laboratory must 
be able to receive and handle large amounts of nuclear materials, yet still be able to 
analyze trace levels of the material constituents and environmental types of materials.  It 
should be fully qualified to current standards in environmental, safety, and health 
protocols, hazardous waste disposal procedures, and hazardous materials handling and 
storage.  The nuclear analysis laboratory should be intimately familiar with the 
requirements of a legal investigation, including the ability to perpetuate the sample chain-
of-custody that began in the field.
Analysis of material
The forensic scientists will first develop an initial experimental plan, including methods 
for preventing contamination or cross-contamination of the evidence.  Because of the 
dynamic nature of the forensics process, the scientists will modify the experimental plan 
as new information about the sample or the investigation is obtained.  Since nuclear 
material is often not homogeneous, a single bulk analysis may not be appropriate to fully 
categorize, characterize, or attribute the sample.  Good sampling techniques will be 
required to adequately characterize the radioactive evidence. Particles of stray minerals, 
unique industrial materials, pollen, spores, etc., may become associated with the package 
along the trafficking route.  The unique signatures of such particles may provide strong 
evidence of the route taken by the package.  In addition, when the amount of material 
being sampled is small, the experimental plan must allocate the limited amount of 
sample.  In this case, it is important that all non-destructive analyses be performed first 
and that trace and microanalytical techniques be favored over techniques that require 
large amounts of material. 
Nuclear material analysis
Nuclear forensics involves an iterative approach, in which the results from one analysis 
are used to guide the selection of subsequent analyses.  In this way, radioactive materials 
analysis applied to nuclear forensics proceeds in a manner not unlike that of traditional 
forensic analysis.  It is important to emphasize that all sampling and analysis must be 
performed with due regard for preservation of evidence and perpetuation of the chain-of-
custody.  The sampling process can equally extract and obliterate evidence.  Many of the 
analytical tools used in radioactive materials analysis are destructive, that is, they 
consume some amount of sample during analysis.  Therefore, the proper selection and 
sequencing of analyses is critical.
The nuclear forensic scientist has a wide array of analytical tools to use for detecting 
signatures in radioactive material.  These individual techniques can be sorted into three 
broad categories:  bulk analysis tools, imaging tools, and microanalysis tools.  Bulk 
analysis tools allow the forensic scientist to characterize the elemental and isotopic 
composition of the radioactive material as a whole.  In some cases, bulk analysis is 
necessary to have sufficient material to adequately detect and quantify trace constituents.
Imaging analysis tools provide high magnification images or maps of the material and 
can confirm sample homogeneity or heterogeneity.  Imaging will also capture the spatial 
and textural heterogeneities vital to fully characterize a sample.  If imaging analysis 
confirms that the sample is heterogeneous, then microanalysis tools can quantitatively or 
semi-quantitatively characterize the individual constituents of the bulk material.  The 
category of microanalysis tools also includes surface analysis tools, which can detect 
trace surface contaminants or measure the composition of thin layers or coatings, either 
of which could be import for interpretation.
The Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group (ITWG) has achieved 
general consensus on the proper sequencing of techniques so as to provide the most 
valuable information as early as possible in the interpretation process (see Table 1).  This 
consensus was achieved through discussion and consultation at regular meetings, as well 
as from experience developed from two round robin analyses.
Table 1.  Sequence for Techniques/Methods*
Techniques/Methods 24-Hour 1-Week 2-Month
Radiological Estimated total activity
Dose Rate (α, γ, n)
Surface Contamination
Physical
Characterization
Visual Inspection
Radiography
Photography
Weight
Dimension
Optical Microscopy
Density
SEM (EDX)
XRD
TEM (EDX)
Traditional Forensic
Analysis
Fingerprints, 
Environmentally
sensitive samples
Fibers
Isotope Analysis γ-spectroscopy
α-spectroscopy
Mass spectrometry
(SIMS, TIMS,
MC-ICP-MS)
Radiochemical
separations
Elemental/Chemical ICP-MS
XRF
Assay (titration, IDMS)
GC/MS
*All times above refer to time after receipt of sample(s) at the nuclear forensic 
laboratory.
Traditional forensic analysis
Traditional forensic analysis, like radioactive materials analysis, is an iterative process, in 
which the results from one analysis are used to guide the selection of subsequent 
analyses.  The forensic analyst must carefully examine all of the items seized at the 
incident site in order to uncover as much information as possible.  Unlikely and 
apparently unrelated evidence often are key to the successful prosecution of a case.  Once 
again, all sampling and analysis must be performed with due regard for preservation of 
evidence and perpetuation of the chain-of-custody.  The collection of traditional forensic 
evidence on radioactively contaminated materials must also be performed in a manner
consistent with good radiological safety practice.
The variety of traditional forensic evidence, as well as the methods of collection and 
evaluation, is almost limitless.  For example, evidence such as tissue, hair, fingerprints, 
and shoeprints can often associate a specific individual with a specific place or object.  
The analysis of fibers, pollen, or chemical substances found at the incident scene can 
provide information about motives or transportation routes.  Documentary evidence 
provides useful information not only in the content of the communication itself, but also 
in the incidental details of its creation (paper, ink, film type, extraneous noises, and 
accents).  Similar to collection of radioactive evidence, the international community has 
agreed upon a sequence for traditional evidence collection.  In Table 1, the collection of 
fingerprint and environmentally sensitive samples, e.g., gunshot or high explosive 
residues or DNA bearing samples, must occur within the first 24 hours after sample 
receipt.  Fingerprint evidence should be collected by non-destructive means first (laser 
and photographic methods), then by dusting and lifting.  The chemical analysis of other 
evidence by techniques, such as gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS), may 
occur up to two months after the recovery of evidence.
Nuclear interpretation
Case development is very much a deductive process (see Figure 1).  The nuclear forensic 
expert develops a hypothesis or set of hypotheses based upon the results so far.  This 
hypothesis suggests additional signatures, which either might or must be present if the 
hypothesis is true.  The expert then devises tests to verify the presence or absence of the 
signatures.  Access to other experts around the world, to forensics knowledge bases, and 
to archived sample libraries are important tools that allow the nuclear forensics expert to 
formulate the hypothesis and the method to test it.  If these tests show that the signature is 
absent, then the nuclear forensic scientist must abandon or adjust his hypothesis to fit the 
new results.  If the tests show that the signature is present, then either a unique 
interpretation has been achieved or additional tests must be devised to exclude the other 
possible scenarios. At the beginning of the nuclear forensics process, the results from the 
radioactive materials analysis and traditional forensic analysis will most likely be 
consistent with many scenarios.  As the process continues and new results prove 
inconsistent with those scenarios, certain scenarios are excluded.  In the optimum case, 
only a single scenario will eventually prove consistent with all results.
Sampling
Categorization
Hypothesis Building
Confidence
Analysis
(Radioactive Material &
Traditional Forensic)
Interpretation/
Exclusion
Case Knowledge
Knowledge Bases
Archived Material
Other Experts
Figure 1.  Flow Chart of Interpretation Process
Analytical results should be interpreted by experts representing a spectrum of all forensic 
specialties.  Nuclear forensic experts use both an empirical approach, through the 
previous analysis of nuclear and other radioactive materials, and a modeling approach, 
based upon the chemistry and physics of nuclear processes to predict relevant signatures 
from those processes.  They also use their knowledge of analytical science to select the 
appropriate methods to verify the presence or absence of predicted signatures.  It is 
important to remember that all interpretations must follow the rules of evidence 
appropriate to the jurisdiction of the case.
Relevant signatures
Signatures are the characteristics of a given nuclear or other radioactive material that 
enable one to distinguish that material from other materials.  These signatures enable one 
to identify the processes that created the material, aspects of the subsequent history of the 
material, and potentially the specific locales in the history of the material.  Forensic 
scientists classify signatures as either comparative or predictive.  Comparative signatures 
allow the comparison of an unknown or “questioned” sample versus a set of known 
samples.  Predictive signatures allow deductions about the source, purpose, 
manufacturing method, etc., of a sample from basic chemical and physical principles –
without reference to a known sample.
Signatures include physical, chemical, elemental, and isotopic characteristics of the 
material.  Physical characteristics of the material include the texture, size, and shape of 
solid objects and the particle size distribution of powder samples.  For example, the 
dimensions of a fresh nuclear fuel pellet are often unique to a given manufacturer.  The 
particle size distribution of uranium oxide powder can provide evidence about the 
uranium conversion process.  Even the morphology of the particles themselves, including 
such anomalies as inclusions, can be indicative of the manufacturing process.  Chemical
characteristics of the material include the exact chemical composition of the material or 
the association of unique molecular components.  For example, uranium oxide can be 
found in many different forms, e.g., UO2, U3O8, or UO3, each of which can be found at 
various points in the uranium fuel cycle. Elemental signatures of the material include the 
determination of major, minor, and trace elements in the material.  Major elements, of 
course, help define the identity of the nuclear material, but minor elements, such as 
erbium or gadolinium that serve as burnable poisons, help define its function.  Trace 
elements can also prove to be indicative of a process.  Isotopic signatures of the material 
include the detection of fission or neutron-capture products, which are indisputable 
evidence that the material has been in a nuclear reactor and serve as a fingerprint for the 
type and operating conditions of a given reactor.  Other isotopes are decay products from 
radioactive “parent” isotopes in the material.  For example, 230Th is a decay product of 
234U and 235U is a decay product of 239Pu.  Because radioactive isotopes decay at a rate 
determined by the amount of the isotope in the material and the half-life of the parent 
isotope, one can use the relative amounts of decay products and parent isotopes to 
determine the “age” of the material (time since the parent isotope was last chemically 
separated from its decay products).
Access to knowledge from the broadest collection of experts increases the chances of a 
unique and successful interpretation of the data.  Sharing of information between 
international nuclear forensics laboratories leverages the extensive experience and newly 
developed capabilities of each laboratory to derive new and valuable information from 
the material analysis. The participation of other nuclear forensics laboratories also allows 
for a peer review of the nuclear interpretation process, increasing confidence in the 
validity and impartiality of the interpretation effort.  As already noted, international 
collaboration is essential to the worldwide problem of control of nuclear material. By 
their very nature, nuclear incidents can be dynamic and itinerant, with nuclear material 
sourced in one site and transported to another. The ability to share some details of 
specific incidents, unique analytical capabilities, and knowledge databases is important 
for countering the nuclear threat.
It is important to remember that different signatures exist for different materials at 
different points in the nuclear fuel cycle (see Figure 2).  Each processing step has the 
ability to both create new signatures in the product material and destroy signatures 
present in the incoming feed material.  Currently, no signature has been identified that 
persists throughout the nuclear fuel cycle.  Therefore, any signature must be referenced to 
a specific material and point in the fuel cycle.
Figure 2.  The Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Knowledge Bases
Extensive knowledge bases of nuclear processes and nuclear forensic data are necessary 
for effective interpretation of the laboratory results and their successful application to 
existing information on the sources, methods, and origin of nuclear materials throughout 
the world.  This ability to compare signatures with existing knowledge and data is at the 
heart of the interpretation process.  These knowledge bases are presently maintained by a 
variety of international, national, and non-governmental entities.
There are current efforts to develop and organize knowledge bases that catalogue nuclear 
processes for use in nuclear forensics investigations. Many of the basic nuclear processes 
are documented in textbooks, reports, and papers in the open literature. These documents 
can be found in technical libraries, as well as the World Wide Web. The IAEA web-site 
(http://www.iaea.org/), for example, has a number of databases that document publicly 
available information about nuclear facilities around the world.  Proprietary or classified 
processes, though, may only be documented in the so-called “closed” literature. 
Companies are often willing to share proprietary information with national nuclear 
forensics laboratories after the execution of an appropriate non-disclosure agreement. In 
addition, national laboratories are usually able to access the classified literature of their 
own country, but obviously not those of other countries. This makes international 
cooperation between nuclear forensics laboratories of vital importance to solving certain 
cases.
In some cases, such as the combined Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU)-Bochvar 
Institute database for commercial nuclear fuel [16-18], these knowledge bases contain 
components that can be freely shared among the participants, as well as components that 
contain proprietary information to which access is restricted. Experts from each 
participating country or organization, as part of a worldwide network, maintain access to 
their own databases and knowledge bases to which they have full access. In response to 
queries for information from other experts in the network, they can respond by releasing 
the results of the queries without compromise of any of the restricted information or data 
that underlie the response. Thus distributed data can be used to create information for the 
network with due consideration for data security.
Comparative analyses of interdicted material and archived samples (samples stored and 
available for analysis) can also be particularly helpful. These analyses allow the nuclear 
forensic expert to establish connections between the interdicted and the archived material 
or between the processes used to create them. As new signatures are discovered that 
depend on new analytical methods, it becomes increasingly important that databases be 
accompanied by archived material. Then, the old material can be re-analyzed by the new 
analytical methods and the resulting data analyzed for the presence or absence of the 
newly discovered signatures. Sample archives can include “real world” nuclear forensic 
samples, reactor fuel stock, other nuclear materials, and industrial radiation sources. 
Statistical techniques
Any knowledge management system will rely on analytical tools and methods that are 
strongly mathematically based to elicit pattern, temporal trends, and group membership 
analyses.  Multivariate analysis techniques e.g. multi-dimensional feature extraction, 
variable discrimination, and pattern classification, are used to investigate 
multidimensional data and form the “mathematical brain” enabling comparative and 
predictive signature analysis.  Confidence articulation, based upon the results of these 
multivariate analyses, is an important requirement for these multivariate techniques.  
Timelines
As production processes changes, the signatures inherent in the material will also change.  
Therefore, methods are needed to capture process knowledge and subject matter expertise 
as a function of time, e.g., material production process changes, to enable ready 
discrimination of signatures.  The development of material production timelines is one 
method that should be effective in capturing the relevant process knowledge that would 
impact signatures throughout the nuclear fuel cycle.  Comprehensive materials 
production timelines enable 1) narrowing of the applicable information field by using age 
dating information from a questioned sample and 2) capturing of the characteristics of 
relevant processes and process changes from cognizant experts that would impact 
signatures during material production.  
Confidence in the conclusion
Analytical quality
Because the results of the nuclear forensics analysis and interpretation could be used as 
evidence in a criminal prosecution or affect international estimates of proliferation and 
threats of terrorism, it is essential that the data and their interpretation is credible. 
Adherence to chain-of-custody procedures will ensure that the analytical results 
correspond to evidence collected at the incident site. Proper quality assurance and quality 
control procedures within the nuclear forensics laboratory will ensure confidence in the 
analytical data.  Nuclear forensic laboratories typically implement a recognized quality 
system, such as ISO 9000, ISO 17025, or ASCLD International [19-21].  A quality 
system encourages the establishment of documented procedures for sample control and 
analysis, which improves the repeatability of results and provides an enabling mechanism 
for continuous quality improvement.  The establishment and registration of a quality 
system is important not only for its internal benefits, but also for the confidence that it 
inspires externally. 
Precision & accuracy
As required by good analytical protocol, all analytical results should state the precision of 
the measurement and any potential sources of error not reflected in the precision.  In the 
absence of bias, the precision of the measurement can place bounds on which sources and 
processes could produce material with the given signature.  Although increasing the 
precision of a given measurement could narrow the field of potential sources or processes 
that produced the material as shown in Figure 3, it s often more efficient to perform 
additional measurements using independent techniques (techniques that verify the 
presence or absence of different signatures than the initial technique).  The confidence in, 
and the specificity of, the interpretation often increase as more independent 
measurements are made as shown in Figure 4.
 
Technique A
Improved
Precision
Technique A
Original Precision
Potential Sources & Processes
Figure 3.  The Effect of Improved Precision on the Quality of Conclusions
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Figure 4. The Effect of Multiple Analyses on the Quality of Conclusions
Sensitivity
The sensitivity of the methods of analysis will be particularly important when the amount 
of evidence is small.  In some cases, illicit traffickers may initially deliver only a tiny 
sample, which is purportedly representative of a much larger batch of material, to their 
customer.  Even for interdictions of large amounts of material, the analytical techniques 
should be as sensitive as possible, because trace species are often significant components 
of a signature.  However, as the sensitivity of the analysis increases, so does the 
susceptibility to contamination and other interferences.  For example, the analyst might 
have to decide whether the Fe and Cr detected in the analysis is the signature of a certain 
manufacturing process or merely contamination from a stainless steel spatula used to 
collect the evidence.
Communication of results
All results and assessments must be communicated in the form of a technical report.  
Reports may be issued periodically during and after the conclusion of an interdiction 
event to keep decision makers apprised of recent data and insights from the investigation.  
For example, the laboratory could issue reports to coincide with the availability of results 
from the sequence of techniques and methods in Table 1 (24 hours, 1 week, 2 months). 
However, a final report must also be issued after the conclusion of the event.  The nuclear 
forensics laboratory should identify all data and other information used in the assessment 
and include the rationale for the conclusion.  The laboratory should also identify any 
information that conflicts with the assessment and why they are choosing to disregard or 
discount that information.
Ideally, there should be an unambiguous method of specifying the confidence in the 
conclusions to decision-makers.  The international nuclear forensics community has not 
yet reached a consensus on such a method.    It is difficult to summarize a vast body of 
evidence, each with its own uncertainty, with a single categorization.  However, such a 
categorization must be made to communicate the strength of the evidence to decision 
makers who might not have the requisite technical background to rigorously evaluate all 
stages of data acquisition and analysis.  Therefore, nuclear forensic researchers are 
seeking to develop and demonstrate methods to articulate confidence in nuclear forensics 
interpretations that are based on combining disparate data and information.  The 
articulation of confidence when formulating conclusions based on disparate datasets is at 
the heart of enabling credible interpretations of nuclear forensics data.
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